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Abstract 
This paper discusses the technical assessment of recommended 
train unavailability and component unreliability baselines for 
the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mitigating Systems 
Performance Index. To perform this evaluation, recent data 
were compared with the recommended baselines. Comparisons 
indicate that the recommended baselines appear to accurately 
represent recent (1999 – 2001) industry experience. 
Disclaimer 
This paper summarizes work sponsored by an agency of the US Government. 
Neither the US Government nor any agency thereof, nor any employee, makes 
any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or 
responsibility for any third party’s use, or the results of such use, of any 
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed in this paper, or represents 
that its use by such party third party would not infringe privately owned rights. 
The views and opinions of authors expressed therein do not necessarily state or 
reflect those of the US Government or any agency thereof. 
1 Background
The Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) is a proposed Performance 
Indicator (PI) for US commercial nuclear reactors that would replace the existing 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) 
mitigating system PIs. For each mitigating system addressed, the MSPI (change 
in core damage frequency, or 'CDF) is defined as the following [1]: 






























 ¦   (Eq. 3) 
UAI is evaluated on a train unavailability (UA) basis and summed over all trains 
within the system. URI is evaluated on a component unreliability (UR) basis and 
summed over all monitored components within the system. Terms with the 
subscript “p”, including the Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance, are determined from 
the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The terms UAt and URc represent 
plant-specific estimates (obtained from performance data over the most recent 
three years), while the terms UABLt and URBLc represent baseline estimates against 
which the current values are compared. The MSPI for a mitigating system is then 
an approximate measure of the plant 'CDF resulting from changes in system UA 
and UR performance relative to prescribed baseline performance. 
This paper discusses the technical assessment of recommended UA and UR 
baselines for the MSPI. To perform this evaluation, recent data were compared 
with the recommended baselines. Comparisons indicate that the recommended 
baselines appear to accurately represent recent (1999 – 2001) industry experience. 
The originality of this work involves the comparison of recommended UR 
baselines with recent unpublished data from industry and US NRC programs and 
the evaluation of whether plant-specific or industry-average train UA baselines 
should be used. 
2 Evaluation of Recommended UR Baselines
The MSPI monitors unreliability performance of pumps, emergency diesel 
generators, and selected valves in five types of mitigating systems: emergency ac 
power (EAC), high-pressure injection (HPI or HPCI), heat removal (AFW or 
RCIC), decay heat removal (RHR), and cooling water support (SWS and CCW). 
Therefore, component unreliability baselines are required for emergency diesel 
generators (EDGs); motor-driven, turbine-driven, and diesel-driven pumps 
(MDPs, TDPs, and DDPs, respectively); and motor-operated and air-operated 
valves (MOVs and AOVs). Also, these unreliability baselines should reflect 
recent performance of such components at US commercial nuclear reactors. To 
meet these requirements, the MSPI proposes to use industry-average component-
type failure rates published in the journal article “Historical Perspective on 
Failure Rates for US Commercial Reactor Components” [2]. The failure rates in 
the journal article were generated using information from the Equipment 
Performance Information Exchange (EPIX) database over the period 1999 – 2001 
[3]. Failure data submitted to EPIX include events detected during periodic 
testing and during unplanned demands. To evaluate whether these failure rates are 
appropriate for use in the MSPI, comparisons were made with plant-specific data 
submitted by 20 plants during the MSPI pilot program. Results are summarized in 
Table 1. The quality of the pilot plant data submitted might be higher than similar 
information submitted to EPIX, but the pilot plants represent only 20 of the 103 
US commercial reactors that report data to EPIX. In general, the MSPI pilot plant 
data agree reasonably well with the recommended MSPI UR baselines. However, 
a single DDP at one of the pilot plants appears to be degraded [provided several 
fail to start (FTS) and fail to run (FTR) events within the three-year period of data 
collection]. This is reflected in the resulting DDP FTS and FTR values obtained 
from the pilot plant data, which are higher than the MSPI recommended 
baselines. 
Also, comparisons were made using data from recent updates to older, published 
US NRC system studies [e.g., 4]. These studies typically include failures detected 
during unplanned demands. However, depending upon the system, some types of 
periodic tests (mostly 18-month shutdown tests) are also included. To perform 
these comparisons, approximate adjustments were made to the updated system 
study data to eliminate failures outside the MSPI component boundary and to 
place FTR events occurring within the first hour of operation into the FTS 
category. Again, results from these comparisons indicate that the failure rates 
presented in the journal article accurately represent industry performance over the 
period 1999 – 2001 and are appropriate for use in the MSPI. 
Mean Failure Probability or Rate Component Failure 
Mode MSPI Baseline MSPI Pilot Program 




Data (? – 2001) 
MOV FTO/C 7.0E-4/d 1.4E-3/d <9.8E-4/d 
AOV FTO/C 1.0E-3/d 6.3E-4/d No data 
MDP Standby FTS 1.9E-3/d 4.4E-4/d 2.5E-3/d 
 FTR (>1h) 5.0E-5/h 3.0E-5/h <2.4E-4/h 
MDP Running FTS 1.0E-3/d 5.0E-4/d No data 
 FTR (>1h) 5.0E-6/h 1.2E-5/h No data 
TDP Standby, 
AFW 
FTS 9.0E-3/d 2.8E-3/d 9.7E-3/d 
 FTR (>1h) 2.0E-4/h <2.4E-4/h No data 
TDP Standby, 
HPCI/RCIC 
FTS 1.3E-2/d <4.7E-3/d 1.2E-2/d 
 FTR (>1h) 2.0E-4/h <2.4E-4/h No data 
DDP Standby FTS 1.2E-2/d 2.1E-2/d <1.0E-2/d 
 FTR (>1h) 2.0E-4/h 4.8E-3/h No data 
EDG Standby FTS 5.0E-3/d 3.1E-3/d Not updated 
 FTLR 3.0E-3/d 3.4E-3/d Not updated 
 FTR (>1h) 8.0E-4/h 5.8E-4/h Not updated 
Circuit Breaker FTO/C 8.0E-4/d No data No data 
Acronyms: AFW (auxiliary feedwater system), AOV (air-operated valve), DDP (diesel-driven pump), 
EDG (emergency diesel generator), FTLR (fail to load and run for 1h), FTO/C (fail to open or close), 
FTR (fail to run), FTS (fail to start), HPCI (high-pressure coolant injection), MDP (motor-driven 
pump), RCIC (reactor core isolation cooling), TDP (turbine-driven pump) 
Notes: FTS includes FTR events that occur within the first hour of operation. All failure probabilities 
and rates were obtained using a Bayesian update with a Jeffreys noninformative prior. “<” indicates 
no failures. The start date for system study data varies by component. 
Table 1. Comparison of MSPI component failure rate baselines 
with other sources of data. 
One unusual guideline associated with the MSPI UR baselines is the inclusion of 
FTR events occurring within the first hour within the FTS category. This 
guideline provides a simplistic way to account for standby pumps and EDGs 
having different FTR rates for operation during the first hour and for continued 
operation after the first hour. (In the journal article discussed previously, FTR 
rates are presented for both periods, less than one hour and greater than one hour. 
Typically, the latter case has a failure rate approximately 15 times lower.) To 
obtain the FTS UR baselines, the FTR rate for less than one hour was multiplied 
by one hour of operation. The result was then added to the FTS probability to 
obtain a FTS probability that incorporates FTR within the first hour. 
3 Evaluation of Recommended UA Baselines
The MSPI proposes to define train UA baselines by dividing UA into planned and 
unplanned outage contributions. The unplanned contribution is an industry 
average value (1999 – 2001) that varies by system and train type. However, 
because of concerns that industry average values for planned outage contributions 
may not be appropriate for specific plants, the planned outage contribution is 
defined to be plant specific, rather than industry average. These planned outage 
baselines are obtained from plant-specific outage data for 1999 – 2001. 
Resulting MSPI UA baselines (averages of the plant- and train-specific baselines) 
are compared with ROP averages (planned and unplanned outages only) for the 
entire industry in Table 2. The MSPI mean values were obtained from the 20 pilot 
plants, while the ROP data come from the entire industry, 103 plants. Again, the 
MSPI UA baselines, at least in terms of the overall average values, agree with 
available comparison data. 
Also presented in Table 2 are the high and low baselines from the pilot plants. For 
some of the system train types, there is a large variation between the low and high 
values. 
System Train Type MSPI UA Baselines 
(1999 – 2001) 
ROP 
(1999 – 2001) 
  Mean Low High Mean 
EAC EDG 1.3E-2 3.9E-3 2.4E-2 9.4E-3 
HPI MDP 5.8E-3 1.0E-3 1.2E-2 5.2E-3 
HPCI TDP 1.0E-2 7.7E-3 1.5E-2 1.0E-2 
AFW MDP 4.8E-3 2.2E-3 9.1E-3 5.1E-3 
 TDP 4.9E-3 1.0E-3 7.5E-3 5.1E-3 
 DDP 8.4E-3 8.4E-3 8.4E-3 5.1E-3 
RCIC TDP 1.2E-2 9.7E-3 1.7E-2 1.2E-2 
RHR (BWR) MDP 6.2E-3 3.3E-3 1.2E-2 7.6E-3 
RHR (PWR) MDP 6.0E-3 9.0E-4 2.3E-2 5.8E-3 
SWS MDP 2.0E-2 1.4E-3 7.9E-2 No data 
CCW MDP 8.2E-3 3.0E-4 2.4E-2 No data 
Acronyms: AFW (auxiliary feedwater system), BWR (boiling water reactor), CCW (component 
cooling water), DDP (diesel-driven pump), EAC (emergency AC power system), EDG (emergency 
diesel generator), HPCI (high-pressure coolant injection), HPI (high-pressure injection), MDP (motor-
driven pump), PWR (pressurized water reactor), RCIC (reactor core isolation cooling), SWS (service 
water system), TDP (turbine-driven pump) 
Notes: The ROP data do not distinguish between train types for AFW. 
Table 2. Comparison of MSPI train UA baselines with ROP values. 
Two issues related to the proposed train UA baselines were evaluated: does plant-
specific planned UA vary sufficiently to justify using plant-specific baselines 
rather than industry-average baselines, and should planned UA data for similar 
trains within a system be pooled? Both issues were evaluated by examining the 
planned UA baseline data and follow-on performance data submitted by 20 plants 
during the MSPI pilot program. Results indicate that planned UA baselines do 
vary significantly between plants (as shown in Table 2), supporting the MSPI 
recommendation for using plant-specific baselines for planned UA. However, 
follow-on UA performance data indicate that the MSPI recommendation to use 
train-specific UA baselines for systems with similar trains is probably not 
appropriate. (Differences in baseline values often were not justified based on 
follow-on performance data from these similar trains.) 
4 Summary
The comparisons presented in this paper indicate that recommended UR and UA 
baselines for the MSPI program are appropriate. These baselines represent 
component and train performance over the period 1999 – 2001. For both UR and 
UA, comparisons with other sources indicated good agreement. 
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